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Soviet Everyday Culture: An Oxymoron?
Svetlana Boym
Mikhail Mishin, a Soviet satirist, wrote that Russians recognize themselves
in the famous fairy-tale character Ivan the Fool. He bides his time napping
on the heated furnace and gets up only to undertake major heroic feats.
Ivan the Fool might be a great hero, but he has no idea how to survive his
everyday life. Everyday life, captured in the Russian word byt, is a more
dangerous enemy to him than the multi-headed fire-spitting dragon. The
everyday is Russia 's cultural monster. The nation might worship its
heroes and their fabled ability to withstand hell or high water, but it also
celebrates their impracticality and helplessness in the face of everyday
life.
The distinguished linguist and literary critic Roman Jacobson claims that
the Russian word for the everyday, byt, is culturally untranslatable into
other languages: in his view, only Russia among all the European nations
was capable of fighting "the fortresses of byt" and of conceptualizing
radical alterity to the everyday (byt). [1] The opposite of byt, the spiritual,
poetic or revolutionary being (bytie), is at the heart of Russian culture. In
a similar way, Vladimir Nabokov claims the Russian conception of
"banality," poshlost -- a word that refers at once to artistic triviality, lack
of spirituality, and obscenity -- to be absolutely original. In Nabokov's
view, only Russians were able to devise neatly the concept of poshlost' -because of the "good taste of old Russia." [2] (This is perhaps one of the
least ironic sentences in Nabokov, bordering on the banal). No wonder,
another word that was claimed to be untranslatable is podvig -- heroic
feat, dynamic force. It does not necessarily refer to a specific courageous
accomplishment; rather, it embodies the notion of unlimited dynamism,
perpetual movement (dvizhenie) itself. [3] Two Russian "untranslatable"
words, then, one referring to the everyday and the other to the heroic
feat, are closely linked and reflect what Russian and Soviet Russian critics
perceive to be a fundamental feature of Russian mentality. For many
Russian and Soviet cultural critics, the expression "everyday culture"
would appear problematic, if not oximoronic, because culture in the
Russian context, in the singular and with a capital "C," has been defined
as a heroic battle against the everyday [4] .
Thus, there are radical differences between the "American dream," the
dream of the private pursuit of happiness in the family home, and the
Russian dream that -- at least in the conception of Dostoyevsky and his
great admirer, the philosopher of the "Russian idea," Nikolai Berdiaev --

consisted of spiritual homelessness and messianic nomadism. In Russia ,
the preoccupation with the everyday was frequently conceived as petitbourgeois (marked by the derogatory term "meshchanstvo"), inauthentic,
unspiritual or counter-revolutionary: it was fought against by Westernizers
and Slavophiles, romantics and modernists, aesthetic and political
utopianists, Bolsheviks and monarchists alike. To some extent, the
modern concept of a secular everyday culture has never sunk roots in
Russia .
If the American dream is pursued in the individual family house, the
Soviet dream can only be fulfilled in the communal house. Our central
archeological site of Soviet civilization is the communal apartment. It is at
once a memory of Soviet collective home, the institution of social control,
and the breeding ground of the grass root informants in Stalin's times. We
will eavesdrop behind the flimsy communal partitions and on the "private"
collections of "domestic trash" and kitschy souvenirs. Those everyday
rituals, practices of deviation and secrecy reveal how the official
ideological designs were inhabited. As such, they seem to precede and
survive both the Soviet ideology and the communal apartment itself. I will
combine the perspective of a cultural critic with my own memories of a
former communal apartment resident who never fulfilled her "communal
duties" and was frequently chided by watchful neighbors.
Any discussion of everyday culture is inevitably anachronistic; it raises
issues of continuity and change in the national self-definition and daily
practices in Russia , from prerevolutionary to post-Soviet times, from the
time when there was no single word for "privacy" to the post-Soviet era,
when privacy became a buzz word. If byt exemplifies the collective
Russian mentalities, which have survived long durations of time, wars,
uprisings, and revolutions, so does the opposition to byt, the antibyt discourse that is also a part of Russian collective mentality. The
opposition between byt and bytie can be traced back to Russian Orthodox
dualism between the sinful existence of this world and the blessed
transcendence beyond it. Later, it will be redefined and perpetuated by
symbolist poets (Block, Bely, Soloviev) and the avant-guarde
revolutionary theorists (Tretiakov, Bogdanov); by Soviet semioticians
(Boris Uspensky and Yuri Lotman) and the philosophers of the "Russian
idea" (Berdiaev). Boris Uspensky and Iurii Lotman insist that the binary
opposition between byt and bytie is a fundamental feature of Russian
culture; they point out the crucial difference between the Western
medieval "world beyond the grave," divided into three spaces -- heaven,
purgatory and hell, and the Russian medieval system, based on a
fundamental duality. In Russia , the everyday could not therefore be

perceived as a neutral sphere of the human behavior where the concepts
of "civil society" and private life originate. [5] But is Russian history (like
anatomy) destiny? Do the critics of culture describe the historical situation
of the past, perpetuate cultural mythology, or both? In other words, is
there, in fact, no neutral sphere of behavior in early modern Russia, or
has it simply been insufficiently described by Russian cultural historians,
and hence not integrated into the Russian cultural identity as constructed
in literary and political writings? [6]
The Soviet construction of "new byt" did not escape the old dichotomy
of byt and bytie. In this respect, there is a clear ideological continuity
between the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia and early Soviet
leftist theorists. [7] The Soviet iconography of the new byt was thought
through to the last detail -- or, as Mayakovsky put it, to the last button on
one's suit." The new byt, one of the early Russian revolutionary dreams,
was based on the complete restructuring of both time and space; from
Gastev's utopian schedules of everyday life to the total design of the new
communist space, from the all-people's house-commune to the making of
new men and women. But can everyday life be contained by a utopian
topography? Perhaps it is not surprising that hardly anywhere else in the
modern Western world in the twentieth century did such a precise
construction of ideologically correct everyday life exist; nowhere else
there were so many deviations from this utopian construct. [8]
New Byt and Stalinist Domestic Bliss
Let us begin the discussion of iconography of Soviet everyday life with a
picture of a Stalinist domestic idyll. It is represented by Laktionov's
programmatic painting "Moving to The New Apartment." The room is
cheerfully lit, although the source of light is hidden from us. It is the
natural light of the Socialist Realist bright future. In the center is a
middle-aged woman with a war medal, proud mistress of the new
apartment, who seems ready to break into a Russian folk-dance. Nearby is
her son, an exemplary boy and young pioneer. A portrait of Stalin takes
the place of a father. The gazes of this Soviet family do not meet; the
mother looks into the audience as if inviting our approval, the son looks
up to his proud mother, and Stalin looks in the opposite direction, as if
watching us through the half-open door, guarding the limits of the visible.
The scene appears to belong to some familiar totalitarian sitcom: the
characters wear appropriate Soviet uniforms and freeze in the established
theatrical poses known from films and paintings, as if waiting the
predictable prerecorded applause. A few neighbors with whom the family
will share the communal apartment gather at the door, jolly smiles frozen

on their faces. The furniture in the room is very sparse and the private
objects are limited to books, a radio set, toys, a political poster, a globe
with the largest country of the world usually colored in bright pink, a
balalaika, an a sickly-looking rubber tree plant (Fikus) in the foreground.
The painting is neither reflective nor self-reflective; people and objects
hardly cast any shadows, and there is no mirror hidden in the corner. The
scene flaunts its perfect transparency of meaning. Michel Foucault's The
Order of Things ( Les mots et les choses), with an icon of early modern
civilization, Velazquez' Las Meninas, which tests the rules and limits of
representation, exposes visual trompe l'œil, and at the same time pays
homage to the patrons of art -- in this case the royal couple. "Moving to
the New Apartment," though similarly an icon of Soviet civilization that
prescribes the order of everyday things, carefully hides all visual and
ideological manipulations. This is the way a culture wishes to see itself and
be seen, without thinking about the act of seeing. There are no uneven
brush strokes and no blind spots; rather, everything is made readable in a
didactic way, to the point that nobody has to bother reading it. The books
near the rubber tree plant are all works by established Russian and Soviet
classics -- of which the revolutionary poet Vladimir Mayakovsky stands
out, and on the poster we can read the slogan "Glory to our beloved
Motherland!" The painter cannot afford being suggestive or allow anything
contingent and accidental to appear on the canvas. [9] This is a perfect
Socialist Realist genre scene reminiscent of the old Academic paintings.
What is important is that this is not an image of cozy petit
bourgeoisdomestic bliss, not a picture of that settled and established
private life by definition suspect by the Soviet order. [10] Moreover, this is
not merely a private family festivity, but a celebration of the Soviet
collective in miniature, in the newly repaired communal apartment. There
is no distinction between public and private here, only one fluid and
seemingly cheerful ideological space.
It is difficult to imagine what could have been judged "ideologically
incorrect" in this painting that is so carefully and moderately ideological.
Yet its seamless surface was censored twice from two different sides: first,
for the rubber tree plant, and later, for the portrait of Stalin. One could
draw a mental diagonal to connect those two images that were
iconographically incorrect. When the painting was first exhibited in the
early nineteen fifties, it was the rubber tree plant in the foreground that
"rubbed" critics the wrong way. The painting was accused of celebrating
the petit bourgeois values embodied in the rubber tree plant and of
"varnishing Soviet reality." The rubber tree plant was regarded as a
symptom of counter-revolutionary andpetit bourgeois tastes, a personal

item that should not be a part of collective iconography. But what is so
wrong with rubber tree plants?
When I have explained the painting "Moving to the New apartment" to my
American students, they have attempted to figure out what, specific to
this plant, made it into a symbol of bad taste. But no knowledge of
horticulture was helpful in this case. The "rub" is not inherent in the
rubber plant as such; rather, it depends fully on the context. It turns out
that the rubber tree plant is a part of American mythology of the nineteen
fifties as well, but its meaning is completely different. Here is a passage
from a song featuring a rubber tree plant very popular in the fifties,
entitled "High Hopes": "Just what makes that poor little ant/Think he can
move that rubber tree plant/. He's got hi-i-i-gh hopes, he's got hi-i-i-gh
hopes. . . ." Here the plant is a symbol of natural obstacles to be
overcome by confidence and hard work, a milestone on the way to the
American dream.
The portrait of Stalin is located on a straight diagonal from the rubber tree
plant; it almost appears that the "great leader of all people" is turning his
eyes away from this bourgeois "flower of evil." In albums of Soviet art
during the 60s after the half-hearted official campaign of de-stalinization,
the painting appeared without the portrait of Stalin that was deemed in
bad taste. It was seen as a kind of historical embarrassment, implicating
the painter and his audience in the Stalinist compromise. By covering up
the compromise of mass collaboration with Stalin, the critics of the 60s
engaged in another compromise, one of forgetting. The erasure of the
portrait continued a long tradition of erasing and remaking of history that
originated in the 20s and continued through the late 80s. It consists of
omitting historical embarrassments and -- to use the term of a Stalinist
art critic -- of "varnishing" the reality of authoritarian representation.
Since this is a didactic painting, we are supposed to learn a lesson from it,
and the lesson is that the everyday is as natural as the rubber tree plant,
that history and ideology are as hidden as the portrait of Stalin, and that
the relationship between everyday and ideology is as "seamless" as the
painting.
As we begin to uncover the ideological roots of the rubber plant, the
cultural plot thickens. It reflects many paradoxes in the Soviet
construction of the "new everyday" (novyi byt). The iconography of the
rubber plant is ambiguous. It might have been regarded as the last sickly
survivor of the exotic palm trees of the imaginary "greenhouses" of the
upper bourgeoisie, or a poor relative of the infamous geranium on the
windows of the merchant dwellings that were purged and physically

eradicated in the campaign against "domestic trash" in the Stalin's time.
The rubber plant, an iconographic blemish on the image of Socialist Realist
domestic bliss, and perhaps the only true-to-life object in the painting,
can function as a trigger of cultural memory and a key to the "archeology"
of Soviet private and communal life. This cultural archeology is not
without contradictions. [11]
The communal apartment depicted in the painting is a far cry from the
house-commune imagined by the revolutionary architects in the early
Soviet era. In the post-revolutionary period, architecture turned into a
major art -- an arch-art, a material embodiment of the revolutionary
superstructure, a foundation of the social order. It was a rational art of
conquering and reconstructing the mysterious, the unresolved, and the
chaotic. Since Marx and Engels did not develop a specific picture of
communist life, post-revolutionary visionaries turned to utopian writers
like Moore, Campanella, Owen, Fourier, and tried to adopt for practical use
their exemplary Ikarias and Cities of Sun. The modern utopias, called sots
gorod (socialist cities), were expected to spread around the whole world
through the "socialist resettlement of mankind." The house-commune was
envisioned as a microcosm of the sots gorod. The sots gorod, in turn,
served as a microcosm of Soviet society as a whole. The elaborate
projects for house-communes were developed by Melnikov, Ginsburg,
Vengerov, and others. The nucleus of the new utopia, the "housecommune," reflected an ideal of "socialism in one building," to use the
expression coined by Richard Stite [12]. The house-commune, also known
as the "new proletariat house," radically reconstructed the individualist
bourgeois quarters; it de-familiarized them by replacing the familiar
bourgeois family structure with "proletarian comradeship." In the housecommune, children were to be cared for collectively to alleviate the
burden that once fell upon the bourgeois family's individual members. A
popular slogan was making headway at the time, "Down with the
dictatorship of the kitchen!" The individual kitchen was denounced as a
symbol of the nuclear family and women's enslavement by byt. By
contrast, communal home was not just a retreat for the individual, a place
marked by personal traces and memories; rather, it was a public and
therefore ideologically charged site. The communal dwelling's simple and
stark geometry had to be enjoyed for its own sake. Characteristically,
contemporary Soviet theorists praised empty spaces shot through with
light, uncluttered by objects and personal artifacts that could spoil the
dwelling's pristine purity. Where domestic objects appeared, they were to
be strictly non-representational and anti-realistic, hinting at alternative
spatial dimensions that transcend industrial domesticity. El Lissitsky
compared the room of the future "to the best kind of traveling suitcase."

He wrote that, for a modern person, it was enough to have an empty
room, a mattress, a folding chair, a table and a gramophone. [13] (The
gramophone was his concession to popular taste).
The campaign for the new byt began with the debunking the old byt. Both
new and old byt acquired their specific features in the 20s, when the
revolutionary intelligentsia joined in the bolshevik attack on byt. In his
suicide note, Vladimir Mayakovsky, Soviet society's foremost revolutionary
poet, wrote: "The love boat has crashed against byt." This was not only
the fate of his personal "love boat." In the poet's eyes, the revolution
itself was held hostage to everyday life. Mayakovsky feared that
communism would be murdered by yellow canaries and the revolution
would be betrayed by Marx -- in the crimson frames of a
cozy meshchanski interior. Mayakovsky fought against all signs of postrevolutionary domesticity, such as rubber plants, lyrical gramophone
songs, and all kinds of pets, dead or alive -- kittens, canaries, and the
infamous elephant figurines. Porcelain elephants, symbolizing private
happiness, would become notable enemies of the Soviet regime from the
20s to the 90s. No other animal, except perhaps for a few birds of bad
taste -- like pink flamingos or yellow canaries -- was to receive such a
shabby treatment from the revolutionary artists.
In 1928-29, responding to the poet's call, the Newspaper Komsomolskaia
Pravda started a campaign "Down with Domestic Trash." "Let us stop the
production of tasteless bric-à-brac!," urged the newspaper. "All these
dogs, mermaids, figurine devils and elephants only help smuggle
backmeshchanstvo. Clean your room! Summon bric-à-brac to a public
trial! [14] The campaign recreated the rhetoric of the civil war and cultural
revolution. In 1929, the plans were lain for a series of exhibits "On the
Manifestation of Meshchanstvo in Art" and "On the Anti-Aesthetic Objects
in Worker's Byt." It could be compared with the Nazi exhibit of
"Degenerate Art," except that the Soviet exhibit was supposed to be about
the "degenerate everyday." Actually, the Soviet project never got off the
ground because the cultural politics changed drastically by the late 1930s.
The war against the "little gods of things" was a war against fetishization,
reification, and objectification of life's simple pleasures, but it was also a
war for the war's sake, a nostalgia for the nomadic life style of a true
revolutionary. Which is why the furniture had to be simple and portable
(skladnaia), always ready to be folded and carried along during some
major political offensive, economic drive or military campaign. Many leftist
artists who were bent on designing the authentic revolutionary everyday
were purged during this era. Ironically, the war against "domestic trash"

outlived its idealistic proponents.
By the mid-30s, the trashing of domestic life and the critique of
philistinism temporarily subsided, after expunging some of the left
intellectuals who attempted to transfer revolutionary art into the practice
of everyday life. The new acquisitiveness of Soviet citizens was cautiously
encouraged in official writings, partially in order to justify and partially to
disguise the legitimation of new order of social inequality, with special
privileges allocated for the Stalinist elite (who usually resided in spacious
private apartments). [15] Yet, there was tension in the official acceptance
of domesticity, and the depiction of its ideal iconography is unstable. In
the period of High Stalinism, especially after the war, came the attempt to
create a different iconography of the everyday, in not an avant-guarde but
imperial socialist realistic style, with the privileged few; yet, some
iconographic elements -- including the rubber tree plants, those peculiar
Soviet flowers of evil -- survived. The purging of the rubber plant, from
20s avant-guarde to 50s Socialist Realism, reveals some paradoxical
continuities of the utopian vision, although the styles of those two utopias
were quite different. It also points to some tragic paradoxes in the
Socialist realist culture which, in a rather cruel manner, realized the old
dream of the Russian intelligentsia -- the dream of creating a unified
"people's culture" by abolishing the distinction between "high" and "law."
During the 30s, intrusion into the everyday became more than rhetorical - the home search (obysk) grew to a haunting image of the new Stalinist
perestroika of everyday life. The brightly lit room of "Moving To The New
Apartment" is so paranoidly codified because behind the threshold there is
another scene, that of "removing someone form an old apartment" -- the
scene of the arrest and home search.
The 1950s saw a brief domestic revival, a new infatuation with pinkshaded lamps and escapist sentimental romances about "banana-lemon
Singapore ," sung by the repentant Russian emigre and born-again
patriot, Alexander Vertinsky. The intelligentsia of the 60s criticized the
collaborationist philistinism of Stalinist culture and recreated the spirit of
nomadic romanticism characteristic of the 20s. It sang about the trips "in
search of the fog and the smell of taiga," about the romances of alpinists,
geologists, and flight attendants, and launched its own "campaign against
domestic trash." This was a peculiar romantic crusade against domestic
coziness, against not only pink lamp shades and porcelain elephants, but
also all kinds of comfortable furniture -- soft divans and armchairs, loveseat sofas, "lyra," and plush curtains -- in the belief that one had no need
to cultivate little domestic nests. Although the 60s returned in many ways

to the revolutionary and very mildly avant-guarde discourse of the 20s
(mildly, because most of the art works and texts remained unavailable),
yet this return was in many ways revolutionary, particularly in the
understanding of self and private life. The official "collective" was
rewritten as an unofficial association of friends, a rather casual community
of transient soul-mates. Occasionally, one of the soul mates would report
on another one, occasionally the other one would be called to KGB, but as
the Soviet anecdote has it, a great progress was made in Brezhnev's
times -- the 10-year prison-sentence joke became only a three-year one.
In some ways, this imaginary community of the 60s friends ironically
flaunted its own fragility. By the late 1960s, "privacy" began to be seen as
the only honorable and uncompromising response to the system of public
compromise. Not an escape, but rather as a way of carving an alternative
space, and a way of personalizing and deideologizing (to use the favorite
term of perestroika intellectuals) the official maps of everyday life.
In the 70s, after the Soviet tanks trundled into Prague , a different kind of
"nomadism" emerged, the members of intelligentsia went into a private
retreat and questioned the imaginary "kitchen communities" of the 60s.
Some became dissidents and experienced violent invasion of privacy,
including KGB home searches, while others conformed to a life of
stagnation, and a few emigrated abroad -- into capitalist lands where
"privacy" is protected by law and elevated to the status of a state religion.
From there, they observed the collapse of Soviet civilization.
From the ideal image of Soviet collective bliss, marred only by one
ideologically incorrect plant, we will move to its less ideal representation
in the communal apartment of the former Leningrad . My "thick
description" of the communal apartment and the Soviet home -- to borrow
the term from cultural anthropology -- combines its utopian designs and
revolutionary genealogy with the examination of actual everyday practices
that reflect the tragicomedies of Soviet communal living. My reportage
combines images of utopian house-communes envisioned by the
revolutionary architects with the few glimpses into the tragical comedy of
actual communal living. The story of Soviet domestic life and communal
apartment estranges some of the familiar conceptions of domesticity,
privacy, and commodity. From Gogol to Chekhov, domesticity in the
Russian tradition was connected not only with "family values" but also
with poshlost,' and with a routine both endearing and stifling. Communal
apartment is at once a result of the revolutionary war on commodityfetishism, domestic kitsch and poshlost', a fortress of commodities and
kitsch in its own right. My description will be shaped by inevitable personal
memories that will hopefully provide a necessary balance between

familiarity and defamiliarization, between homesickness and the sickness
produced by being home.
The Archeology of the Communal Apartment
Here is another version of the Soviet family romance. Instead of a portrait
of Stalin, there is a televisual image of Brezhnev, who is not listened to,
but merely present as a background noise. My parents were having
foreign guests for the first time in their life in our room in the communal
apartment. Our neighbors, "Aunt Vera" and "uncle Fedya," were home.
Russian children call their adult neighbors "aunts" and "uncles"
euphemistically, as if they were members of one very extended family.
Uncle Fedya usually came home drunk and, when Aunt Vera would refuse
to let him in, he crashed right in the middle of the long corridor -- the
central "thoroughfare" of the communal apartment, obstructing the
entrance to our room. As a child, I would often play with the peacefully
reclining and heavily intoxicated uncle Fedya, with his fingers and his
buttons, telling him tales to which he probably did not have much to add.
This time we were all in the room, listening to music to muffle the
communal noises, and my mother was telling our foreign guests about the
beauties of Leningrad. "You absolutely must go to the Hermitage, and
then to Pushkin's apartment-museum and, of course, to the Russian
Museum . . . ." As the conversation rolled along, and the foreign guest
was commenting on the riches of the Russian Museum, a narrow yellow
stream slowly made its way through the door of the room. Smelly,
embarrassing, intrusive, it formed a little puddle right in front of our
dinner table. This scene, with the precarious coziness of a family
gathering, both intimate and public, and a mixture of ease and fear in the
presence of foreigners and neighbors, remained in mind as a memory of
home. The family picture is framed by the inescapable stream of Uncle
Fedya's urine effortlessly crossing minimal boundaries of our communal
privacy, disrupting the fragile etiquette of communal propriety. (And it
smelled too much to be domesticated or turned into a metaphor).
If there was such a thing as a Soviet cultural unconscious, it must have
been structured as a communal apartment with its flimsy partitions
between public and private, sober-mindedness and intoxication. The
Soviet "family romance," to use Freud's phrase, now in its melancholic
twilight stage, is punctuated by the fluttering sound of a curious
neighbor's slippers or by an inquisitive representative of the local Housing
Committee. It is a romance with the collective that is equally unfaithful to
the communitarian mythologies and to traditional family values.

In 1926, Walter Benjamin wrote a provocative and laconic sentence in his
essay about Moscow: "The Bolsheviks have abolished private life." Private
life in Soviet Russia, Benjamin felt, was to be eliminated along with
private property. Anything private was denigrated as politically dangerous,
literally de-prived of social utility and significance. Benjamin astutely
noticed that just as private life was collectivized, public cafés tended to
disappear as well. Somehow, the two were linked together. A public
sphere embodied in the café culture shriveled away along with the excised
private life, with critical intellectuals becoming an endangered species on
their way to extinction.
"Privacy" is a notoriously recalcitrant word when it comes to finding for it
a Russian analogue. Does it mean that "private life" was lacking in Russia
, that it was completely abolished by the Bolsheviks, as Walter Benjamin
claimed, or perhaps that it was never properly acknowledged and
conceptually appropriated by the Russian intelligentsia? All examples
given in the famous Dal's Dictionary of the Russian Language under the
entry "private life" seem tendentious and negatively colored. [16] From
Fonvizin and Herzen to Dostoyevsky and Berdiaev, Russian thinkers
ridiculed the Western middle class ideal of "a chicken in every pot and a
little house of your own." The Russian soul was supposed to be homeless
and impervious to the middle-class appeal of private life. The latter
seemed alien to the Russian mores by definition, or perhaps it is the lack
of definition that made it appear non-Russian. Russian writers declared
private life as practiced in the West to be "inauthentic" and unspiritual. By
the same token, Western travellers to Russia , from the Marquis de
Custine to Benjamin, lamented its inhabitants' flagrant disregard for
private space. (Custine observes that the bed is among the least used
items of Russian furniture, acquired mostly for public display. [17] )
The Russian kommunalka, a term of endearment and deprication for
communal apartment, owes its being not just to a housing crisis; it
derives its roots from a political aesthetic program, a revolutionary
experiment in collective living.Since very few house-communes were
actually built, the authorities resorted to a cheaper option: reconstructing
and partitioning already existing "bourgeois quarters." This was the first
compromise with the utopian idea of house-commune and the first tacit
acknowledgement that the drive for the new byt might not be fully
successful. Perhaps only utopian ideas could have been fully inhabited.
As so many other things in Soviet Russia, kommunalka sprang from
Lenin's head. A few weeks after the October Revolution, Lenin drafted a
plan of expropriation of "big apartments." Any apartment was considered

big if the number of rooms in it equaled or exceeded the number of its
regular residents. [18] (A Russian poet, Joseph Brodsky, once called his
family's living quarters "a room and a half"). Lenin's decree reflected a
different perspective on home and space than the one found in the West.
A person, or rather an impersonal statistical unit was entitled not to a
room or a private space but to certain square footage. The space is
divided mathematically and bureaucratically, as if it were not a "living"
space, a concrete home once inhabited by real people, but some
topological abstraction. As a result, countless apartments in major cities
that were partitioned in the most bizarre manner, creating unlivable
spaces, long winding corridors, black entrances, and labyrinthine interior
yards.
In the literature and art of the 20s, the search for the dwelling-place lost
appears to be an all-embracing passion, and identity crisis is closely linked
to the housing crisis. In the literature and film of the 20s,
'defamiliarization" is not simply a metaphor for a literary device, but also a
central thematic preoccupation -- a frustrated attempt to create a new
Soviet family in the context of the housing shortage. Love, hatred, and
even melancholia are all secondary passions -- it is usually love of
"dwelling space" (zhilploshchad), hatred for those who have it, and
melancholia for the housing lost. The quest for housing space and
furniture appears to be the major driving force of plot in the 20s literature
and film.
Structurally, many literary works and films of the 20s are organized
around a very desirable object of furniture. Thus the celebrated film 'Bed
and Sofa" (Tretia meshchanskaia, 1928) portrays a peculiar love triangle - between a young woman, her husband (the representative of the new
Moscow proletariat), and his friend, a printer with whom he fought in the
Civil war. The friend moves in with the couple because he simply has no
other place to live. The bed and the sofa in the film are like musical chairs
-- the husband and the friend change their positions and move from
spousal bed to marginal sofa as the plot of the film unfolds. It is
appropriate that in both the English and Russian titles of the film are not
the names of the heros but the symbolic names of the street they live on
or the prominent objects of their household. At the end, the heroine
abandons the uncomfortable communal arrangement leaving the two men
in their rather unusual male bonding over a cup of tea with jam. The
satirical tales of the late 20s and early 30s contain abundant tragicomic
images of neighbors persuading each other to commit suicide for their
sake, of publicly shamed intellectuals composing iambic tetramentmeters
in the communal closet while their neighbors are busy expropriating the

rooms of absent explorers of the North Pole, or subletting six single beds
in one communal apartment. [19] In Mikhail Bulgakov's novel, Master and
Margarita, the communal apartment turns into the most fantastic place on
earth -- more fantastic than the palace of Ponty Pilat . The Satan's ball
takes place in the "fifth dimension" of the Moscow communal apartment.
The devil himself is amazed at the tricks of Moscow "apartment exchange"
and the expansion and divisibility of the dwelling space in the postrevolutionary capital.
Since the late 20s and especially during Stalin's times, the communal
apartment has become a major Soviet institution of social control and a
form of constant surveillance. The laws of strict "resident permits"
(propiska) and the campaign against those who were deprived of the
rights of citizenship (lishentsy) were all connected to the consolidation of
communal apartment. The communal apartments were under observation
of the local Housing Committee and were a training ground for grass root
informants in Stalin's times. By the mid-30s, "separate apartments" came
into being that became a sign of a special privilege, or occasionally, a
special luck. [20] Only in the late 50s, new revolution in Soviet daily life
began with the resettlement of the communal apartments in the "microdistricts" in the urban outskirts, where many for the first time in their life
were able to have a state-owned separate apartment. These newly built
houses were given the unflattering name Khrushchoby, a cross between
Khrushchev and trushcheby or slums. Until 1990, about 40% of the
population in the urban centers like Leningrad lived in communal
apartments. As a form of living, the communal apartment combined
futuristic designs and premodern ways of living, reminiscent of
leprosiums, hospitals, camps, and other earlier forms of imposed
communality. In a sense, communal apartment is Soviet society in
miniature, a leap of faith from utopian theory to everyday reality, as well
as a sadly deconstructive allegory of what happened to revolutionary
constructivism.
Soviet kommunalka shared with house-commune (dom kommunna) more
than a linguistic root. It was engendered by the same revolutionary
topography as the house-commune and propelled by the same utopian
longing for unfettered collectivity. Architecturally, both were alike in two
crucial respects: communal kitchen (though each family had its own pots
and pans and a gas burner on the shared stove) and the corridor clearly
marking (though never fully separating) the public and private spheres. If
the house-commune was a microcosm of the ideal revolutionary universe,
the communal apartment was an actual Soviet microcosm. Economic
hardship was not the sole reason why the purist socialist idyll turned into

a social farce. The problem is that any utopia, be it social, political or
architectural, is a u-chronia, forced atemporality, interrupted time-flow,
life standing still. What architectural utopia does not take into account is
history; both in the broad sense of social history and in a sense of
individual history with its multiple narratives of everyday life.
The Psychopathology of Soviet Everyday Life
The partition is the communal apartment's central architectural feature.
Made of plywood and oddly situated, the partition marks the intersection
between the public and private spheres within a communal dwelling.
Because of the chronic housing shortage, the old rooms and corridors
were endlessly partitioned and subdivided, creating angular spaces,
windowless living quarters, and rooms overlooking half-lit back yards.
Tenants strained their imagination by inventing all manner of curtains and
screens to mark minimal privacy. A plywood partition was a far more
tenuous barrier against the invasion of privacy than a wall, more a sign of
division than a division itself. Too flimsy to keep secrets from your
neighbors, the partition served to create an illusion that some intimacy
was possible after all.
Privacy in the communal apartment was often equated with secrecy. The
secret was a way of life, a form of resistance to forced communality. I
recall how in the kindergarten we used to play a game called "secrets."
We would go to the far end of the park somewhere near the fence off the
public paths and perform a ritual burial of secrets in the ground. The
"secret" could be a fragment of colored glass, an old stamp, a discarded
candy wrapper, an old badge -- any useless "found object" that exerted a
peculiar fascination on us. The "secret" -- something to be hidden in order
to be shared -- served to affirm a bond of friendship, to escape an
imposed collective sociality, to create an alternative community. The
game of secrete was opposed to the official game of hide-and-seek where
there was nothing to conceal and therefore nothing to uncover. The real
secret in our game was a voluntary community that we built. This secrecy
celebrated and dramatized play-acting, albeit in a different mold. This was
not your run-of-the-mill children's game encouraged by the adults, but a
symbolic bonding that transcended the officious sociality of Soviet
everyday life. Adults in the communal apartments would play their own
games of secrets trying to establish unofficial communities, but not
necessarily individual privacy.
One of the main features of communal interactions was "performance
disruption." Sexual disruption or a sudden invasion of the couple's

intimate life is comically featured in Soviet fiction and films. Soviet
sexologists consider the lack of privacy, coupled with the deeply
internalized fear of interruption, to be the major source of sexual
disfunction and neurosis among Soviet people. Embarrassment is endemic
to communal life; it is fed by a painful awareness that one has very little
control over one's life, that one is doomed to act in the other's presence.
One could not be embarrassed in complete solitude. Embarrassment
requires an audience; it is an exemplary trope for social theatricality.
Etymologically, the word embarrassment signifies physical obstruction. It
was first applied to human relations only in the 18th century. Ever since,
it has been inexorably present wherever the private and the public
spheres rub against each other. The incident with uncle Fedya's urinating
in the communal corridor is embarrassment the Soviet style.
Embarrassment my mother felt in front of honored guests, along with
nonchalance she tried to feign to cover up uncle Fedya's "impropriety,"
were familiar to every Soviet citizen. The embarrassment was such a
commonplace that it became ritualized and internalized in the Soviet
psyche. It might have even engendered a kind of communal tolerance, an
attitude of benign neglect the collective adopted in the face of an odd
scene or awkward circumstances. But it also concealed repressed anger
which could break into open any moment.
A locus of Soviet communality, communal apartment can be both
endearing and stifling. It is hardly the rational communality of selfselected members imagined by the 19th century social-democrats or by
the 20th century architects who designed house-communes. The latter
were based on the assumption that the new collectivity would make
obsolete the extended and nuclear family. Communal apartments are
communal by necessity, not by choice. The communal neighbors are
joined together in a kind of "mutual responsibility" (krugovaia poruka),
i.e., they share the duties, use each other's property, and partake in
domestic gossip. This is essentially a pre-modern type of collectivity and
centralized control that spread in Russian villages since the time of Mongol
invasion. Yet, the comparison can be made only with the village commune
stripped of its romantic and patriotic idealization; moreover, the central
feature of communal apartment is precisely the clash of different classes
and social groups, of people with different backgrounds unlike the fairly
homogeneous neighbors of patriarchal village communes). The main
features of the village life that influenced Russian political folkways
included the following: "a strong tendency to maintain stability, a kind of
closed equilibrium, risk avoidance, the considerable freedom of action and
expression "within the group," [and] the striving for unanimous final

resolution of potential divisive issues." [21]
Various survival strategies were adopted by the inhabitants of communal
apartments which helped mitigate the harsh realities of communal living.
The very deficiencies of communal living were sometimes turned upside
down and used to accentuate the inhabitants' individuality. Thus the
neighbors would often exaggerate their separateness by mounting their
own individual door bells, vociferously guarding their exclusive access to a
particular gas burner, or setting up personal electricity gauges. At the
same time, residents in communal apartments tended to internalize the
communality as a fact of life and a guarantee of stability.
The communal apartment was a classical Soviet stage where the chorus of
conservative public opinion prevailed and where many, though not all,
impossible conflicts were resolved. For instance, public opinion would
compel an intellectual residing in an apartment to refrain from reading in
the communal closet; the drunkard would be assigned a special kitchen
corner where he could rest while sobering up; kids were expected to
wheel their bicycles in the communal corridor very quietly, and Aunt
Shura reported to the local KGB officer only every other political joke, not
all of them. The communal stage was not only the field of battle but also a
field of compromise. Alcoholism, which became rampant in Brezhnev's
times, was tolerated as a fact of life. The social psychologist Alexander
Etkind sees alcoholism as a metaphor for stagnation (in Russian zapoi, "an
alcoholic binge," and zastoi, "stagnation," rhyme.) The addict was not
compelled to sober up, and a consistently sober person was looked at with
suspicion: nobody should stand out in the collective and be better than
the next person. In a way, alcoholic intoxication was a state of mind most
adequate to bizarre Soviet reality. "The best moments in the life of an
alcoholic are not his sober achievements but the drunken unity with equal
others." [22] No wonder Gorbachev's reforms began with the antialcoholism campaign.
Individualism or uncommon behavior were discouraged in communal
apartments, just as they were in the old village commune, and envy
permeated relations between residents. "Envy" is the title of one of the
earliest Soviet novels of Soviet cohabitation that preceded communal
apartments. While envy is by no means peculiar to Soviet everyday life, it
is marked here by what Igor Kon, a leading Russian sociologist, calls
"historical immaturity." It is akin not so much to the competition present
in developed capitalist societies but to interactions found in pre-industrial
communities, where relationships are governed by a "zero-sum"
presupposition: one person's gain is regarded as the other's loss.

According to Kon, "the dictatorship of envy, disguised as social justice,
efficiently blocked individual efforts to do better and to rise above the
average," and it discloses "a general mistrust of the individual
achievement and the fear of social differentiation. [23]
Any communal apartment dweller is scared for life by that symbolic
"mutual responsibility" -- a double blind of love and hatred, envy and
attachment, secrecy and exhibitionism, embarrassment and compromise;
people in collective dwellings professed to hate any form of communal
interaction, yet, they often internalized the communal structures and later
recalled them with nostalgia. An elderly woman, a Russian emigre now
living in the United States , suffered all her life in the horrendous
communal apartments. Now she complains of solitude: "Worse come to
worst, even after peeing in your teapot, they [my neighbors] would call
you an ambulance when you needed one, or lent you a little bit of salt for
your cooking . . . it is this spoonful of roughly grained salt that I miss so
much."
Communal apartments have no living rooms, bedrooms or studies -- only
"rooms," so the traditional "bourgeois division of labor" and the separation
of domestic spheres are supposed to be banished. The room is an ideally
transformable stage fit for all occasions. It can be made into a bedroom, a
guest room, a dining room, a nursery or a salon. The kitchen is not a
communal meeting place; quite to the contrary, it is a place of forced
communality that must be avoided. One recently interviewed communal
apartment resident called it "domestic Nagorno-Karabakh" (a region in the
former Soviet Union torn by an ethnic strife). The communal kitchen is a
battleground -- not of ideas, but of petty rivalries. What is at issue here is
who burns more gas, whose turn it is to cook or clean, and who is to
blame for the breakdown in communal etiquette. Each family has its
burner and a designated time to use it. When the cooking is done, the
family members make sure they carry to their rooms all their pots and
pans so that nobody else would use those scarce personal belongings. In
the same way, toilet paper, a rare commodity in the Soviet Union , was
kept in the room and carried inconspicuously to the toilet. However, for
those who could not procure toilet paper, there was usually the newspaper
Pravda stocked in the bathroom to be read or put to another functional
use. The intellectual in the communal closet -- in the literal rather than
literary sense -- is a character prominently featured in Soviet literature.
In the 1960s, an alternative kitchen culture began to appear in Soviet
society, following Khrushchev's thaw. It was widespread among Soviet
intellectuals, especially those lucky enough to have an apartment of their

own. An unofficial kitchen gathering featured frank political talk, good
company, and some food. The kitchen functioned as an informal salon for
the intelligentsia in the 60s. The most important issues were discussed in
the overcrowded kitchen, where people "really talked," shared news,
flirted and occasionally munched on whatever the family's refrigerator
would have to offer. The kitchen salon of the 60s was a perfect site where
grown-up children could continue to bury their secrets and celebrate
shared escapes from the predictability of Soviet life.
Soviet Interiors: Aunt Liuba's Still Life
Benjamin wrote, "To live is to leave traces." [24] Perhaps this is the best
definition of the private -- to leave traces for oneself and for others,
memory traces of which one cannot be deprived. A room in the Soviet and
post-Soviet communal apartment reveals an obsession with leaving
traces, with commemoration and preservation in the most ostensible
fashion. The campaign against "domestic trash" failed miserably in most
communal apartments. Indeed, we can discern signs of rebellion in the
conspicuous accumulation of "domestic trash." The so-called "domestic
trash" (the expression derives from a well known Mayakovsky's play)
survived all ideological purges and changes in leadership. A secret residue
of privacy, it defended people from externally imposed and internalized
communality.
Let us enter the room of a sixty-year old widow, "Aunt Liuba," whom I
visited in the Summer of 1991 and 1992. Liuba N. came to Leningrad from
Belorus after World War II. She was assigned a room in a communal
apartment and found a job as an accountant in the medical student's
dorm. Aunt Liuba belonged to a lower urban strata which never
completely freed itself from meshchanski impulses. Aunt Liuba's room
contained nearly everything that was considered to be in bad taste from
the 20s to 70s, including the infamous rubber tree plant. She did not
move to a newly renovated apartment as in the exemplary Stalinist
painting, but continued to live in the old communal flat for about thirty
years, from the late 50s to the 90s. Her room appears untouched by both
the 60s campaigns for good taste and more recent trends in fashion.
Although the city and the country where aunt Liuba lives have recently
changed their name, her room preserved a certain domestic mentality
that has survived historical upheavals.
This is how the room looked the first Summer after the dissolution of the
Soviet Union . In Aunt Liuba's only room of some 13 square meters, there
is a cupboard -- a kind of a commode made in the early sixties, a bed, a

table, and an old-fashioned TV set. The television stands in the center of
the table on a Russian shawl that serves as a table cloth and is treated
like an altar of modern conveniences. The TV set is covered with a special
lacy cloth that used to cover icons and, later, gramophones, all of which
were treated with a peculiar reverence. Aunt Liuba's room reminds us of
many traditional Slavic dwellings, except that the functions of a stove and
a red corner (where icons were displayed) are now taken up by the TV
and the display shelf of the commode where all the most precious items
are stored for everyone to see. The blinking artificial light of the TV is
reflected in the commode's glass doors, casting bluish shadows upon
personal possessions.
The commode-cupboard is the most important piece of furniture in the
old-fashioned communal apartment room. It has survived the campaign
against domestic trash, the civil war on meshchanstvo, and ironic
debunking by high brow writers. (At the end of Erdman's play The Suicide,
the main character, would-be suicide Semion, begs his neighbors and
friends to spare him and not to force him to kill himself. He is ready to
sign off everything to them, to refuse food, enslave his wife, send his
mother in law to work in the mines, and . . . to sell his commode). The
genesis of the commode symbolizes the development of both bourgeois
commodity and of the conceptions of comfort, home, and interiority.Ifthe
mid-19th century is an historical moment when, in Benjamin's words, "the
private individual enters the stage of history, [25] then the mid 1920s is a
turning point when that private individual goes backstage in Russia . And
yet, the old and rather modest commode found in Soviet communal
apartments reminds us that personal pride and the desire for individuation
have not died.
Aunt Liuba has carefully arranged the objects on her commode. There is a
big plastic apple, brought from her native Byelorussian village, a Chinese
thermos, with bright floral ornaments, a naturalistic porcelain dog, three
bottles containing different glass flowers (daisies and more exotic red
flowers with a touch of elegance), a samovar, a set of folk-style Soviet
porcelain cups. "You see I have it all here, it's my still life," she tells me
proudly as I photograph her room. Curiously, she uses an artistic term
"still life" to describe this corner of her quarters. In fact, she says "nature
morte" -- a Russian gallicism that might have reflected her high school
tours of painting galleries obligatory for Soviet students. The display is
clearly tinged with an aesthetic quality in her mind, as well as with
personal memories. Indeed, there is something pleasing and cheerful in
the brightness and unabashed eclecticism of her collection, which
contrasts sharply with the bleak uniformity of the communal corridors.

How can we frame conceptually this amateur "still life" in the communal
apartment?
In Russia , one can only speak about nostalgia for a still life, nostalgia for
sustained and sustaining materiality of everyday life that withstands the
winds of time and never-ending crises. Liuba's collection of Soviet readymades exemplifying her trivial private utopias and everyday minor
aesthetic, framed by the glass of the commode as if it were a museum
exhibit, is a monument to that desire for a still life, for a life that does not
rush anywhere amidst the whirlpool of social metamorphoses. Liuba's "still
life" has no masterpieces or truly exotic objects: her beloved objects are
all mass-produced and slightly out-of-fashion, giving to the whole scene
an aura of time past. The woman has gathered together all her beautiful
and memorable things. The ornaments clash, re-creating distant images
of the village home and pre-revolutionary images of cozy merchants'
dwellings; their covers, napkins, and laces give the feeling of
"completeness and personal touch" which Benjamin identifies with
bourgeois interiors.
Liuba's room is full of flowers: Soviet Victorian roses on the communal
wallpaper; exotic red glass flowers and simple plastic daisies on the shelf;
stylized gold and yellow daisies on the porcelain, red floral decorations on
the wooden "khokhloma" spoon. The only real flower is a little rubber tree
plant comfortably perched on the window sill (I was glad to find this old
friend here). Aunt Liuba's carefully gathered exhibit presents a daunting
challenge to the theoretical framing of domestic objects.
From the 1920s and through the 1970s, domestic object was a precarious
possession in the Soviet homes, an endangered species constantly
threatened by the ideological, social and economic conditions of the time.
The fact of being denied objects is not only a social deprivation but also a
sensory deprivation, a thwarting of sentience, human contact, the powers
of projection and reciprocity. The war on fetishism carries a different
meaning in a country where most people have experienced the loss of
domesticity at least once in a life time and where the preservation of
domestic objects spelled not so much consumerism as survival.
The artifact on communal display is an object preserving private memory,
a souvenir to privacy itself, a remnant of a pre-industrial and possibly prerevolutionary world. The souvenir displaces the object from common into
individual history. The souvenir's owner becomes the author who
reinvents the objects and their uses and refuses to accept the official
"system of objects," whether that system is the one of capitalist

commercialism or of frugal collective ideology.
The personal domestic objects of aunt Liuba are difficult to theorize. They
are too useless for both use-value and exchange value theories, neither
authentically primitive nor exotic enough for transgressive modern
usages, too trivial and banal in a non-fatal manner to be turned into a
simulacrum à la Baudrillard. In other words, they are impure and
outmoded on all grounds. The analysis of aunt Liuba's still life is about the
everyday resistance to sociological theories, yet her objects can tell us a
lot about eclectic Soviet cultural mythologies. They are not about defamiliarization but rather about domestication of estranged ideological
designs. Liuba's objects are not bare essentials, neither are they objects
of status or conspicuous consumption. If they do represent a need, it is
first and foremost an aesthetic need, a desire for beauty with minimal
available means, or an aesthetic domestication of the hostile outside
world.
In the rooms inhabited by ex-Soviet intellectuals, by contrast, we do not
find cheap old-fashioned chests of drawers. What we encounter here are
the 1960s style wall units and shelves designed in a modern functional
fashion and made in so-called "developed Socialist countries" like Hungary
or even Yugoslavia. On the surface, such objects de-emphasize the
fetishistic quality of the furniture and eliminate the excessive curves and
ornamental details of the commodes. However, the wall units and ample
book shelve space popular among the intelligentsia were also status
symbols, fetishes of rediscovered modernist functionality. Hard-to-get
books and collected works of foreign authors signaled one's membership
in the esteemed status group of intelligentsia (note that the prestige
bestowed on the intelligentsia is itself a trace of the pre-revolutionary
civilization where intellectuals were held in high esteem). Given the
material scarcity in the post-World War II era, personal possessions were
hardly acquired exclusively for "conspicuous consumption." The space
between the folding glass on the bookshelf, an ephemeral space, where
the owners would typically display especially meaningful personal objects
like photographs, images from travel, baby pictures, portraits of
Hemingway, or of popular Soviet bard Vladimir Vysotsky (both with beards
and with or without cigars), snapshots of far-away friends, occasional toys
or souvenirs from Crimea or Susdal, envelops with foreign stamps, loose
pages from disjointed old books, dated newspaper clippings, and so forth.
This narrow two-dimensional space behind the glass covering the book
shelf is a coded image of the room's owner, the person's carefully
arranged interface with the world. The narrative of the treasured objects
cannot be easily reconstructed by the outsider, for it is non-linear,

unreadable, with many blank spots, oddly meaningful banalities and mild
obsessions. It is not a biographical fiction but a fragmented history of
one's fragmented life, a story of spiritual odyssey fashioned by
circumstances, a record of what really matters, assorted traces of lived or
vicariously experienced life that have survived the drudgery of dailyness.
Sometimes, it is a travelogue that regales us with real or imaginary
journeys to exotic places and daring escapes into wishful thinking. In the
60s and early 70s, when traveling abroad was nearly impossible, the
Soviets engaged in "virtual travel" by watching an immensely popular TV
program "The Club of Cine-Travelers," a Soviet version of National
Geographic that offered everyone a free transit to the West and beyond.
There appears to be an unwritten law of fashion which tells everyone
when Hemingway and Pasternak are out and Vysotsky and Solzhenitsyn
are in. With the passage of time, Solzhenitsyn also becomes passe,
supplanted by the photo-reproduction of the exotic and apolitical
Nephertiti, the mythical beauty queen of ancient Egypt whom Soviet
intellectuals inherited from the traveling exhibit, "The Treasures of
Tutankhamen." Now side by side with Nephertiti is a half-dressed foreign
pin-up girl with a non-Russian smile that have replaced all past political
and poetic heroes. Private memorabilia is not deprived of cultural myths;
it is separated from the dominant discourses only by a fragile plywood
partition. But it is the space where fragments of those myths can be
reconstructed in a creative personal collage, even if this collage lacks
aesthetic unity. The objects/souvenirs are often the only personal
possessions, offering us erratic narratives of utopian coziness and
homeliness. Both priceless and cheap, conspicuous and private, they
make us question some cherished precepts of the commodity theory.
The Ruins of Soviet Communality
The communal apartment has always been an exemplary metaphor of
Soviet communality, official and unofficial. Nowadays, it is a frequent
subject of editorials in the post-Soviet press. When Stalin was taken out of
the mausoleum, people joked that Khrushchev had resettled Lenin's
communal apartment, which (the joke is updated in the post-Soviet era)
could be now fully "privatized." [26] A writer Alexander Kabakov ridiculed
Russian ultra-nationalists for their "communal apartment tactics." By
mobilizing neighborhood bullies (kham), Kabakov argues, ultranationalists hope to force intellectuals into playing by their boorish rules of
insult and coercion. [27] Memories of the communal apartment, like
chronic childhood diseases, cannot be cured; communal apartment
strategies of attack, survival, and resistance shaped the mentality of

several Soviet generations.
Once a realm of powerful myths, the communal apartment itself is on its
way to becoming a myth. From a forward-looking utopia, it has evolved
into a nostalgic memory of a quasi-paradise lost. Some former communal
apartment neighbors remember it with a mixture of anger and
endearment, not merely as "domestic Nagorno-Karabakh," but as a place
of their old-fashioned Soviet childhood and youth, when life was difficult,
pleasures simple, and -- for better or for worse -- there did not seem to
be any exit. A recent article in a popular weekly Ogonek titled
"Kommunalka" remembered the communal apartment with bitter-sweet
irony as a never-never land where one could be happy with so little. This
precarious Soviet happiness is now largely extinct. And to many former
Soviet citizens deprived of privacy in the past, the old miseries seem less
frightening than the incoming privatization.
Although the communal apartment lost its status as an officially
sanctioned institution at the end of Gorbachev's reign, it has survived as
an unfortunate fact of life reflecting the continuous housing shortage. The
radical perestroika brought down many old partitions in the former
communal apartments. This latest revolution in everyday life had to
proceed slowly, for it had to grapple with the consequences of the older
campaigns, such as the drive for new byt that brought forth communal
apartments, and Khrushchev's reforms which moved about 30 percent of
Soviet urban dwellers into separate apartments on the cities' outskirts.
Before the privatization campaign, there were 300,000 communal
apartments in Moscow . According to the official statistics, forty percent of
the population in Leningrad , recently renamed into St. Petersburg , still
lives in communal apartments. The housing conditions are particularly
harsh in the city center. Privatizing apartments turned out to be an
excruciating task, straining the emerging post-Soviet legal culture which
has stumbled against the unpredictable (or rather very predictable but
never legally accounted for) webs of Soviet everyday practices. In 1988,
the Council of Ministers approved an amendment to the existing laws that
allowed citizens residing in private apartments to buy them from the city
government. There were very few takers at first. In 1989, only 0.03
percent of all apartments and 0.07 percent of apartment residents turned
their apartments into private property. [28] In July of 1991, the Supreme
Soviet adopted a new law that was designed to speed up the apartment
privatization process. The rooms in the communal apartment still could
not be privatized.
The privatization policy encountered a lot of popular criticism reflecting

not only Soviet prejudices but also the traditional Russian suspicion of
private property. A friend of mine reports a conversation on the trolley
overheard in 1991: "They are going to get privatization vouchers; we are
going to privatize!" To which another person replies, "Aren't you ashamed
to use such words in the presence of women." "Privatization" remains a
bad word for many ex-Soviet citizens. An aging school teacher wrote a
letter to Ogonek, complaining that she was ostracized by other dwellers
residing in the same housing project when she decided to privatize her
one-room standard apartment. She was called "NEP woman, capitalist,
and private property owner" -- the words sound derogatory if not obscene
in Russian and come directly from the vocabulary of the political insults
that carried a mortal danger in the Stalinist epoch: sobstvennitsa,
from sobstvennost, "property owner" or chastnitsa,
from chastnyi (private, particular).
By 1990, only a few completely dilapidated and sub-standard even by
Soviet standards communal apartments had been taken over by artists
and, later on, almost like in downtown Manhattan, reclaimed by the newly
emerging shady businessmen, real estate operators, and some
"astrologists anonymous." After the 1991 law on domestic property
privatization came into effect, a new wave of housing "gentrification" (to
use the American term) began in Russia , which left in its wake the clearly
visible trail of bribery and coercion.
Imagine a post-Soviet nouveau riche, a young woman who works as a
financial director for the international "joint venture" and falls in love with
a dilapidated but spacious Moscow communal apartment featuring bay
windows and a neo-classical facade. She would have to pay to each
communal apartment resident a hefty fee and supply each of them with a
separate apartment where they would be willing to move. Moreover, she
would have to find her way around (usually by bribing) the obsolete yet
fully functional Soviet bureaucrats from the Housing Committee. Also,
there is still in place an old Soviet mechanism of social control -- resident
permit or propiska, without which a person is not allowed to settle in a
given city. "A birthmark of the past," this resident permit is a bureaucrat's
dream opportunity to extol bribery. In one of the many stories I have
heard on this subject, an apparatchik from the Housing Committee
demanded a bribe of no less than $20,000 (probably more than a year's
income of all the building's residents) for the permit to privatize a
particularly attractive apartment on Arbat Street . When the would-be
owner refused to pay the bribe, the bureaucrat resorted to threatening
phone calls demanding that his terms were met. The harassment ceased
only when the aspiring owner solicited help from the wife of a prominent

Russian politician. [29]
These stories point out that the old Soviet ways are far from dead. The old
techniques of coping with the Soviet bureaucracy come handy when exSoviet citizens have to battle for their newly acquired rights. The dream of
a western-style private dwelling is still just a dream for most Russians
who have survived socialism. By the same token, many post-Soviet
reforms are but legal abstractions and nobody know how to put them into
practice. "Free market" and "democracy" remain empty foreign words in
the minds of the Russian people, as "socialist political economy" and
"communism" used to be.
In these post-Soviet, post-communist, post-modern times, all the words
formerly deemed untranslatable into Russian are finding their way into
post-Soviet discourse: mentalnost, identichnost, manadzher, sponsor. The
once ubiquitous adjectives like "collective'" and "communal" are out of
fashion. Everything that starts with the foreign prefix "inter" (like
"international") is in. International companies, joint ventures,
cooperatives are in vogue. And so is privatization in all its numberless
forms. Where in the Soviet past private life used to be forbidden in public,
now there is a newspaper called
Private Life ( Chastnaia Zhizn) specializing in personal ads, cries of
loneliness, and searches for "Western" husbands and wives. One female
reader wrote a funny teasing line, in response to the newspaper's verse
contest, that reflects all the ambiguities and paradoxes of the new and still
untranslatable (or at least unprecedented in any Western language) postSoviet byt: "So, what is to be done? Oh, well, I won't despair. I don't have
personal life but 'Private Life' I do." Here "private life" is placed in
quotation marks; it is only a name of a newspaper, a new cliche of the
post-Soviet language and a fitting name for a newspaper ready to tap a
Soviet language, not yet a "property" of still deprived Russian citizens.
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